The Democratic Legitimacy of Global Public Policy Networks

Analysing the World Commission on Dams.

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Citation


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Foreword

This working paper was written as part of the Global Governance Project, a joint research programme of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, the Free University of Berlin (Environmental Policy Research Unit), and Oldenburg University. Within the larger context of earth system analysis, the Project investigates international institutions, political processes, organisations and other actors that influence the emerging system of global environmental governance. The current focus is on questions of institutional and organisational effectiveness, learning processes in environmental policy, institutional inter-linkages, the role of private actors in governance systems, and models of global democracy. Major analytical tools are qualitative social science methods, including structured case studies, as well as legal analysis and integrated modelling. Project members represent political science, economics, international law and integrated modelling.

Within the Global Governance Project, this working paper contributes to the efforts of the research group MECGLO—New Mechanisms of Global Environmental Governance. The MECGLO research group has been set up in order to analyse the emergence, functions, and effects of the new governance arrangements in which private actors play an increasingly important as well as a qualitatively new role. Research will focus on public-private rule-making, private regimes, ‘type 2’ partnerships, and on the diffusion of environmental policy innovations.

Other research groups of the Global Governance Project include MANUS—‘Managers of Global Change: Effectiveness and Learning of International Organisations’, and GLODEM—‘The Quest for Global Democracy’. More information on these groups is available at the Project’s web site at www.glogov.org. The Global Governance Project also hosts the Indo-German Forum on International Environmental Governance (www.indo-german-forum.net), and it has organised, together with its partners, the 2001 and 2002 Berlin Conferences on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (www.environmental-policy.de).

Comments on this working paper, as well as on the other activities of the Global Governance Project, are highly welcome. We believe that understanding global governance is only feasible as joint effort of colleagues from various backgrounds and from all regions of the world. We look forward to your response.

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Abstract

Global Public Policy Networks have recently been proposed as an innovative instrument of a more effective and more legitimate form of global governance. Taking a closer look at one such network, the World Commission on Dams, the article examines to what extent the hope for more legitimate governance through global public policy networks is justified. The argument unfolds in three steps: First, I argue that the debate on global governance so far lacks a clear and coherent concept of democratic governance beyond the nation state. Second, I then address this theoretical deficit by distinguishing between three conceptual dimensions of democracy: collective self-determination, democratic control, and discursive practice. Third, these dimensions constitute the framework for my analysis of the World Commission on Dams. In sum, I argue that where global public policy networks have been involved in rule making or standard setting, they have largely failed to live up to their democratic promise.
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1 Introduction

Global Public Policy Networks have recently been proposed as an innovative instrument of a more effective and more legitimate form of global governance (see Reinicke and Deng 2000). By bringing together actors from government, private business and civil society in order to find a solution to a specific policy problem, these networks are part of the wider debate on the role of public-private partnerships in world politics. Proponents of the networks expect the institution to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency but also the democratic legitimacy of governance beyond the nation state.¹ This article starts from this latter assumption and explores, by drawing on the experience of the World Commission on Dams (WCD), whether and how global public policy networks can contribute to rendering global governance more legitimate.

To what extent global public policy networks can make such a contribution obviously depends on how democratic governance beyond the nation state is conceptualised. In the literature on global governance, the normative goal of democratisation is often referred to either explicitly or implicitly. For instance, the Commission on Global Governance (1995: xiv) recognises a need “to weave a tighter fabric of international norms, expanding the rule of law world-wide and enabling citizens to exert their democratic influence on a global process.” According to the Commission (1995: xvii), the challenge lies in shaping the governance of global issues responsively to the interests of all affected people and, for this purpose, to grant civil society organizations a more important role within the UN system. Inclusion and participation are two of the catchwords under which the Commission places its search for a better global governance system: “The vision of global governance can only flourish [...] if it is based on a strong commitment to principles of equity and democracy grounded in civil society” (Commission on Global Governance 1995: 6). While the Commission emphasises the need for democratisation of international politics (Commission on Global Governance 1995: 66), its report is rather vague on how such democratisation could be conceptualised. The same holds true for many other contributions to the debate on UN reform. Since they lack a clear and coherent theoretical foundation, they are unable to convey an overall conception of democratic global governance.²

The difficulties in gaining a clear understanding of what could constitute a democratisation are inherent to many contributions. In the words of Richard Falk (1995: 132), “the challenge of democratisation is present, but difficult to articulate, especially in relation to specific policy implications.” As a result, answers to questions about the

¹ Cf. Benner/Reinicke (1999); Reinicke/Deng (2000); Reinicke (1999a, 1999b, 1999c); Reinicke/Witte (1999); Witte et al. (2000); Streck (2001).

² For more recent contributions see among others Alger (1999); South Centre (1996). For a critique of the debate see also (1997).
democratic legitimacy of global governance vary considerably. While some authors advocate a substantive concept of democracy and call for a transformation of existing power structures or a counteraction to dominant market forces (see Brand et al. 2000; Falk 1995), other writers support a more formal conception of democracy and hope for gradual improvements of existing procedures (see below: 18-20). In addition, while some observers perceive a stronger participation of civil society organizations as an actual (Willetts 2000: 207f) or at least potential (Gordenker/Weiss 1996) part of democratisation, others are more skeptical. And while one side conceives of democratisation as decentralisation (Falk 1995; Rosenau 1998) or disentanglement (Entflechtung, Scharpf 1993), others place their hopes on a global ethics (Commission on Global Governance 1995), a global civil society (Archibugi 1998: 222; Barber 2000) or a world republic (Lutz-Bachmann/Bohman 2002). To sum up, much of the global governance literature lacks a clear and coherent concept of democratic governance beyond the nation state against the background of which the claim that global public policy networks contribute to rendering global governance more legitimate could be evaluated.

In order to address these theoretical deficits, section 3.1 distinguishes—after a brief sketch of the claim of global public policy networks (section 2)—between three conceptual dimensions of democracy: collective self-determination, democratic control and the discursive quality of opinion- and will-formation. In section 3.2 these three dimensions of democratic governance serve as the basis for analyzing the World Commission on Dams (WCD) and for evaluating the claim made by proponents of global public policy networks.

The analysis concludes with three main results: First, it shows that proponents of global public policy networks lack a clear and coherent concept of democratic governance beyond the nation state. As a result, they are therefore unable to empirically demonstrate that these networks can enhance the democratic legitimacy—however defined—of international and transnational decision-making. Third, the analysis of the World Commission on Dams along the lines of different approaches to democratic governance shows that global public policy networks do not contribute per se to enhancing the legitimacy of governance beyond the nation state. In contrast, where the networks are involved in rule making or standard-setting, they raise a number of critical questions with regard to their mandate, the definition of legitimate constituencies, their political accountability and further aspects crucial to any idea of democratic governance.

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3 For a constructive proposal of a more legitimate inclusion of civil society in multilateral environmental agreements see Biermann (2001: 330-332); see also Biermann (2002).


2 Global Public Policy Networks and Their Democratic Legitimacy: The General Claim

Global public policy networks are defined as issue specific trisectoral—that is, encompassing governmental, business and civil society actors - networks in which the participants search for a common solution to a transnational problem which no single sector is able to solve without assistance of the others. The networks usually evolve independently of each other as a more or less spontaneous reaction of affected actors to a specific policy problem (Reinicke/Deng 2000: xi). The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (Peters 1999), the Roll Back Malaria initiative (van Ballegoyen 1999) or the World Commission on Dams are examples of such networks. The case studies conducted under the umbrella of the UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks show the wide diffusion as well as the broad diversity of these networks in international politics. 4 At the same time, this diversity points to the conceptual vagueness of the approach. Thus, the variety of phenomena examined in the UN Vision Project ranges from transnational advocacy coalitions to bisectoral co-operation between business and civil society actors (see e.g. Hohnen 1999). In addition to the policy area and their composition, the networks can be distinguished with regard to the functions they fulfil. The literature has identified six main functions of global public policy networks. These are (1) agenda-setting; (2) negotiating rules and standards; (3) collecting and disseminating knowledge; (4) creating or deepening markets where they fail; (5) implementing existing multilateral agreements; and (6) reducing the participatory gap of international politics. Each network may fulfil either one or a combination of several of these functions (Reinicke/Deng 2000: 27-64).

By using the concept of network, the authors build on previous work on policy networks or so-called ‘issue networks’ (Heclo 1978) where the importance of horizontal (self-)co-ordination has been analyzed largely in regional or national contexts (for an overview see Börzel 1998). The core of such a conceptualisation of networks is the idea of decentralised social organisation (Kenis/Schneider 1991: 26). Accordingly, Börzel (1999: 254) defines networks as

“set[s] of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals.”

The strength of policy networks is said to lie in their capacity to address problems of horizontal policy co-ordination. Since repeated interaction and a shared interest in finding a solution to an underlying problem create the conditions for building trust and allowing for communication, policy networks are said to be able “to inten-

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4 Global public policy networks have so far been analyzed mainly within the UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks. For an overview, see the final report of the project (Reinicke/Deng 2000) and the internet pages of the Global Public Policy Institute (www.globalpublicpolicy.net).
tionally produce collective outcomes despite diverging interests of their members” (Börzel 1998: 262; emphasis in the original). In this perspective, policy networks are considered as a specific governance mechanism between or beyond traditional mechanisms such as market or hierarchy (see Mayntz 1993: 43f). The evolution of policy networks can be explained as a reaction to the growing dispersion of resources and capacities among governmental and non-governmental actors (Marin/Mayntz 1991: 19) and to an increased need for horizontal co-ordination resulting from the differentiation of governance structures at various policy levels (Benz 1995: 186).

While the cognitive interest of these network approaches primarily lies in analyzing the complex structures of decision-making processes and in explaining specific policy outcomes, the main concern of the model of global public policy networks is a normative one: the networks are seen as a way to increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of transnational governance. Thus, the approach adopts elements from the more traditional network analysis in a largely unsystematic manner. The concept of network is thus used rather vaguely in almost all contributions to the UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks, and it has a metaphorical rather than an analytical character.

In contrast, the approach builds on some of the globalisation literature and perceives global public policy networks as an institutional answer to altered needs caused by globalisation (see Reinicke 1997: 133; 1998; Reinicke/Witte 1999: 353-361). In opposition to growing interdependence (Keohane/Nye 1977, 1987), globalisation is attributed not to macro-economic forces but to the activities of micro-economic actors. The resulting decoupling of a globalizing private sector from specific territorial units has two major political consequences: political and economic spaces become incongruent, and the task of politically steering the private sector is made more difficult. Stated differently, “Globalisation integrates markets, but it fragments politics” (Reinicke 1999b: 40). Since alternative options such as defensive and offensive intervention both have a strong negative impact on public welfare and since regional integration, too, can only partly solve the problem, intensifying international co-operation appears as the only option in order to regain the congruence of political and economic spheres (cf. Benner/Reinicke 1999; Benner et al. 2000; Reinicke 1998, 1999d). Finally, since traditional multilateralism is perceived to be no longer able to effectively and efficiently address problems of increasing complexity, trisectoral networks are expected to close the gap by linking concrete and limited tasks with rather flexible structures (cf. Reinicke 1999c; Witte et al. 2000).

One of the core hypotheses of the approach is that global public policy networks enhance the legitimacy of international and transnational governance. In this context, networks in which the members negotiate rules or set standards are particularly interesting. While the elaborations of the network proponents do not follow a single and well-specified concept of legitimacy, it is analytically helpful to distinguish between aspects of input, throughput and output legitimacy. Input legitimacy refers to the ques-
tion who decides, throughput legitimacy asks how a decision is made, and output legitimacy is related to what consequences a decision has for different stakeholders (Zürn 1998b: 233-236).

With regard to input legitimacy, Reinicke and his colleagues argue that global public policy networks contribute to closing the participatory gap of international and transnational politics by, for instance, giving voice to stakeholder groups that are marginalized in traditional settings (Reinicke 1999c: 45). The underlying assumption is that the inclusiveness and participatory nature of the network approach—that is, the participation of all stakeholders or at least of all sectors on a representative basis (Witte et al. 2000: 180)—enhances the legitimacy of the process. Here, the possibility of self-government or of “ownership of the process by those with a stake in the outcome” (Witte et al. 2000: 181) is alluded to as a core element of democratic legitimacy. As a result, global public policy networks are seen as an attempt to determine, by means of a dialogue of multiple stakeholders, a global public interest as well as the best way to get there (Reinicke 1999c: 51). The demands which real networks are faced with in particular with regard to the idea of inclusiveness are not overlooked (cf. Reinicke/Deng 2000: 77-89; Reinicke 1999c: 55). However, where the networks succeed in integrating business as well as civil society actors, the benefit is twofold:

“Not only do I believe that the inclusion of those actors actually makes for a better public policy, because they have better information, but it also introduces an element of democratic control by engaging them in the making of these policies” (Reinicke, in Bakker/Gruijters 1998: 59f). 6

Hence, inclusion is considered important not only with regard to input legitimacy, but also to the output legitimacy of decision-making processes. 7

In terms of throughput legitimacy, two arguments are put forth. First, global public policy networks are assumed to enhance the transparency of global decision-making processes (Witte et al. 2000: 178). Second, the communicative mode of action that is expected to prevail within the networks is purported to increase the legitimacy of governance. The networks, it is argued, serve as a forum (Benner/Reinicke 1999: 25) in which the mode of arguing (rather than bargaining) gives participants an opportunity to re-define their interests in a common communication process (Witte et al. 2000: 178). 8 Since such a communication process is also expected to lead to better decisions,

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5 For a definition of the concept of stakeholders, see Hemmati (2002: 2): “Stakeholders are those who have an interest in a particular decision, either as individuals or representatives of a group. This includes people who influence a decision, or can influence it, as well as those affected by it.”

6 For a different position, see Marina Ottaway (2001: 266): “Despite the claims that tripartite agreements will introduce greater democracy in the realm of global governance, it is doubtful that close cooperation between essentially unrepresentative organizations—international organizations, unaccountable NGOs, and large transnational corporations—will do much to ensure better protection for, and better representation of, the interests of populations affected by global policies.” See also Nölke (2000: 354-356).

7 See also Witte et al. (2000: 181) who maintain that “exclusion of any important stakeholder from the process could endanger the entire negotiation process.”

8 On arguing and bargaining as distinct modes of interaction in world politics see Risse (2000); Saretzki (1996).
this argument not only relates to the throughput legitimacy of global public policy networks but also to their output legitimacy.

With regard to this third dimension of legitimacy, effectiveness and efficiency are mentioned as the main strengths of global public policy networks. Among other aspects, the networks are said to enable nation states to regain scope for action and to thereby empower “those that constitute the real basis of legitimate and accountable global governance” (Witte et al. 2000: 187). In addition, the networks are expected to contribute to the long-term goal of creating—or strengthening—a transnational community and to thereby lay the foundations for enhancing the democratic legitimacy of governance mechanisms beyond the nation state (Reinicke 1999b: 41).

In sum, proponents of global public policy networks make and defend their argument that the institution can make a significant contribution to enhancing the democratic legitimacy of international and transnational governance on all three levels of legitimacy. Since the concept of legitimacy is often mentioned but rarely defined in the works of the UN Vision Project, the theoretical justification for this claim is however hardly satisfying. Since, in addition, the empirical case studies on global public policy networks that have been involved in rule-making or standard-setting (cf. Bagshaw 1999; Bobrowsky 1999; Hauffer 1999; Khagram 1999) only marginally address issues of legitimacy, the assumption of enhanced legitimacy stands on shaky ground. In particular, it remains open which concept of democracy or legitimacy could provide a sound basis for such a claim. In order to answer this question, the following section sketches three different understandings of democracy on which the subsequent analysis of the World Commission on Dams will be based.

3 Global Public Policy Networks and Their Democratic Legitimacy: Analytical Framework and Empirical Findings

3.1 Analytical Framework: Models and Dimensions of Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation State

How can democratic governance beyond the nation state be conceptualised? While it is often emphasised that ideas and institutions of democratic governance cannot be transferred one-to-one from domestic settings to transnational governance systems, it just as often remains unclear what alternatives exist. Nonetheless, a number of authors have, in recent years, started to think about democracy beyond the confines of the nation state. The result is—as in theorizing about national democracy—different models give different weight to different aspects of democracy. At a general level, three different types of approaches to democratic governance beyond the nation state can be distinguished: cosmopolitan democracy, which puts particular emphasis on the dimen-
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sion of collective self-determination,\(^9\) pluralist approaches which emphasise the need
for control mechanisms at multiple levels of interaction,\(^10\) and models of deliberative
democracy which are particularly interested in the discursive character of collective
opinion- and will-formation processes.\(^11\) Collective self-determination, democratic con-
trol, and discursive practice can thus be considered as distinctive conceptual dimen-
sions of democracy, reflecting the different emphases of the above-mentioned ap-
proaches. It should however be noted that rather than being mutually exclusive catego-
ries, these three dimensions partly imply and reinforce each other.

Thus, if we talk about enhancing the democratic legitimacy of international or
transnational governance, this can—depending on the underlying notion of democ-
rracy—be translated into ‘more collective self-determination’, ‘more democratic control’
or ‘more discursive opinion- and will-formation’. At this stage, two questions impose
themselves upon the analyst. First, what is the point of reference, that is, in comparison
to which procedures of rule making ought global public policy networks to be consid-
ered as superior? If the specific quality of the networks with regard to rule-making is
seen in their inclusion of both public and private actors, then the most common point
of reference will be intergovernmental negotiations so that, ideally, we can talk about
an increase in the democratic legitimacy if the networks are either more legitimate than
intergovernmental decision-making processes or if, as complementary mechanisms,
they contribute to rendering intergovernmental processes more legitimate with regard
to one or more of the above dimensions.

A second question points to the potential conflicts between different notions of
democracy. In case of such a conflict, it would be essential to devise some kind of rule
that would allow a judgment, for instance, when more collective self-determination can
only be achieved at the cost of less democratic control. One way to solve this theoretical
puzzle would be to restrict the use of the term democratisation to those instances where
there is an improvement with regard to one dimension without there being a deteriora-
tion with regard to any of the other dimensions (cf. Zürn 1998b: 351). Another, and I
think preferable, way would be to refer the issue back to democratic theory whenever
the empirical analysis does not lead to a definite result. An approach that ascribes
greater weight to collective self-determination than to democratic control would, in the
above case, conclude that there is an increase in democratic legitimacy, whereas a dif-
ferent approach might come to a different conclusion. While this solution might not
seem entirely satisfying, it has the decisive advantage of tying arguments made for or

\(^9\) See Archibugi (1998); Archibugi/Held (1995); Archibugi et al. (1998); Held (1995); Held et al. (1999).
See also Höffe (1999, 2002), and the contributions in Lutz-Bachmann/Bohman (2002).
\(^10\) See for instance Rosenau (1998); Zürn (1998a, 2000); Benz (1998a, 1998b). For a critique see Schmalz-
Bruns (1999).
\(^11\) On the concept of deliberative democracy see among others Cohen (1989); Elster (1998); Habermas
(1992, 1996) and the contributions in Bohman/Rehg (1997). For an application to inter- and transna-
tional politics see Schmalz-Bruns (1999); Wolf (2000: 196-204 and Ch. 6; 2002).
against the legitimacy of different institutions or processes to specific theoretical approaches and of thereby making the arguments more accessible for critical analysis.

**COLLECTIVE SELF-DETERMINATION**

The principle of collective self-determination, when considered at the global level of politics, centres on questions of North-South relations. What the abstract principle requires in terms of more concrete policy measures, is however a matter of much debate. The most basic questions are: Who participates (or ought to participate) in which political processes in what manner and who represents (or ought to represent) whom in what ways? In more concrete terms, collective self-determination is about who decides about which issues and procedures of the political agenda; about how the relevant constituencies of issue specific decision-making processes are determined (cf. Schmalz-Bruns 1999: 221-223); and about how to enhance the capacities of less organised or otherwise disadvantaged parts of society to participation in decision-making processes.

Among the different approaches to democratic governance beyond the nation-state, the model of cosmopolitan democracy most strongly emphasises the role of participation. Thus, a democratic political system has to at least create the preconditions for its citizens to actively participate in the policy process (Held 1995: 190). To the question who ought to participate in decision-making, cosmopolitan democracy gives a straightforward answer: the affected. As a result, the problem of determining and including, for a particular decision, the relevant community (or communities) becomes the crucial test for cosmopolitan democracy (cf. Held 1995: 18).

In addition, the principle of political equality which is closely related to the idea of collective self-determination is further specified as “equal ‘access’ or ‘availability’ of political influence within the process of deliberation and decision-making” (Bohman 1999: 502). Although some authors take states to be its addressees (cf. Bienen et al. 1998; Höffe 2002), the principle is usually directed to individuals (Archibugi 1998: 211f). Cosmopolitan democracy recognises that in the real world, equal access is often constrained by a plethora of things, most importantly the unequal distribution of power and resources (cf. Held 1995: 159-188). In order to counteract the asymmetrical distribution of access to political influence, proponents of cosmopolitan democracy suggest legally institutionalising the access by the disadvantaged to global public spheres and decision-making processes (Bohman 1999: 513).

In this way, democracy is eventually conceptualised as the sum of individual democratic rights. The catalogue of democratic rights encompasses civil and political as well as cultural and economic rights and the right to health care and to peace (Held 1995: 191-194). In analogy to this catalogue, democracy consists in implementing and
supporting these rights (Held 1995: 202). In its last consequence, the logic of cosmopolitan democracy can hardly get around the call for a global constitution as an expression of democratic public law. At a more practical level, cosmopolitan democracy accordingly asks for strengthening the role of international law.

For an empirical analysis, the following indicators can be used to determine the degree to which the idea of collective self-determination as conceptualised by the cosmopolitan approach is satisfied: (1) the conditions for active participation of citizens in the process of collective opinion- and will-formation; (2) the equality of access of affected people to the decision-making process; (3) the actual participation of affected people in this process; and (4) the degree to which the different clusters of democratic rights are implemented.

**DEMOCRATIC CONTROL**

In contrast to cosmopolitan democracy, pluralist approaches to democracy do not so much start from the normative standpoint of the individual but rather from the empirical constitution of social and political organisation. One basic assumption of pluralist conceptions of democracy is the idea that social interests can be articulated and organised and that the different interests that exist within societies can be balanced. Accordingly, for pluralist approaches to democracy, it is crucial that power is limited through social institutions such as law and other counterbalances in order to allow for a balance of interests (cf. Schmidt 1997: 151-161). While pluralist ideas of democracy have so far not been systematically applied to processes at the level of global governance, a number of suggestions have been made that follow, in their basic orientation, the logic of the pluralist approach. These suggestions focus less on aspects of collective self-determination but instead emphasise the dimension of democratic control.

An operationalisation of this dimension of democratic control could, for instance, take political accountability as its point of departure. According to this principle, those who represent a constituency in a decision-making process are to be held accountable by the people they are deemed to represent. However, governance systems beyond the nation state differ from national political systems with regard to the means of control they have at their disposal. For instance, since participants of transnational decision-making processes are rarely elected by the wider public or by the different constituencies, control cannot be exerted in the same way as it can with regard to national parliaments. The problem of democratic control is further reinforced by relatively long chains of legitimacy that further inhibit the indirect election or recall of those who negotiate on behalf of their national constituencies. Thus, the transparency of decision-making processes, the access to information, and a functioning public

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12 See also Held (1995: 191): “democracy must be understood as a continuum across which particular rights within clusters will be more or less enforced, and different right clusters will be more or less entrenched.”
sphere become crucial elements of democratic control. Around these elements, pluralist approaches build their models of democratic governance beyond the nation-state.

The clearest account of such an approach is given by James N. Rosenau (1998: 40-47) who discovers effective mechanisms of democratic control beyond the nation-state particularly in the disaggregation of power among a large number of sites of power and actors. A more complex version is provided by Wolfgang Benz (1998a: 358f) who differentiates between the functional arenas of (inter)governmental representation (initiative and implementation), parliamentary representation (decision-making and control) and associative representation (mediation of interests). Benz also regards representation primarily as a means to democratic control. As a result, the establishment of a public sphere is a central precondition for an improvement of the represented communities’ capacity to communicate with and to control their representatives (Benz 1998a: 357f). Finally, the role of transparency and accountability for the idea of democratic governance beyond the nation-state is also discussed in Michael Zürn’s account of ‘complex world governance’ (Zürn 1998b). In his view, one way to increase the democratic legitimacy of decision-making processes would lie in shortening the ‘chains of legitimacy’ so that control could be exerted more effectively (Zürn 1998b: 352f). As an example, national representatives of the European Council of Ministers could be elected directly by their respective constituencies in order to increase their democratic accountability.13

To sum up, the following indicators can guide the empirical analysis in order to determine the degree to which the idea of democratic control is satisfied by a given institutional design: (1) the degree to which power is disaggregated; (2) the transparency of decision-making procedures; (3) the accountability of representatives towards the constituencies whose interests they are deemed to represent; and (4) the degree to which a shared public sphere exists.

**DISCURSIVE PRACTICE**

Finally, models of deliberative democracy consider the discursive quality of opinion- and will-formation processes as the core dimension of the idea of democracy. At the heart of deliberative democracy lies the concept of an ideal procedure for deliberation and decision-making. This ideal procedure has the function of a counterfactual idea in opposition to which actual procedures can be critically evaluated. The common core of different conceptualisations of deliberative democracy is the idea that legitimate collective decisions ought to be the result of a “deliberation about ends among free, equal and rational agents” (Elster 1998: 5). Six criteria of an ideal deliberative procedure can be distilled from the literature: Deliberations need to be free from external

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13 All in all, Zürn’s account however includes elements of democratic control on the same footing as and complementary to self-determination and the establishment of a collective identity as a prerequisite for discursive opinion- and will-formation (see Zürn 1998b: 233-245, 347-361).
and internal coercion and follow principles of argumentation—that is, participants need to provide reasons to support their propositions and these propositions need to be critically evaluated. Further, deliberations ought to be inclusive and public, requiring that all persons possibly affected by a decision have equal access to participation in the deliberative process. Next, deliberations should be approached with an orientation towards consensus of all participants. Finally, deliberations should be open-ended and extend to all issues that are to be decided in the interest of all (cf. Cohen 1989: 22f; Schmidt 1997: 178).

What is most important for the institutionalisation of deliberative democratic procedures is not the size of the community for which a collective decision is to be made but the existence of deliberative arenas in which citizens can make suggestions with regard to the political agenda and participate in the public debate on the issues placed on the agenda (Cohen 1989: 31). Accordingly, deliberative democracy derives its usefulness for conceptualizing democratic governance beyond the nation state in particular from its focus on horizontal co-ordination as well as from the fact that, as a theory, it does not require the idea of a pre-existing community (Wolf 2000: 196). Instead, the procedures of deliberative democracy can themselves be expected to contribute to the constitution of community and solidarity (Schmalz-Bruns 1999: 189).

How can the core concepts of deliberative democracy be rendered applicable for empirical analysis? Simone Chambers (1996: 197-211) suggests that the three principles of universality, rationality and reciprocity can be used as proxies for an approximation to the ideal procedure. The principle of universality demands that no barriers to participation exist that would systematically exclude specific persons or groups of persons from the deliberations. A second indicator for the universality of a decision-making process is the degree of participation—do the deliberations go beyond negotiations between elites or are there organisations through which a critical public can feed in its own position—and the degree to which the affected people show an actual interest in the process. Second, the principle of rationality asks how a consensus is reached and which role power plays in the deliberative process. However, due to the complexity and internality of communication and decision-making processes, it is methodologically difficult or even impossible to determine the role of power with some precision (see also Schmalz-Bruns 1995: 247). Whether a person’s agreement is based on an autonomous decision or not can eventually only be judged by the person herself. In response to these difficulties, the only option is “to become aware of the distortions in communication and discourse, which could be produced by these influences” (Chambers 1996: 203). Finally, the principle of reciprocity relates to the degree to which respect and im-

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14 See also Habermas (1996: 287): „Die Diskurstheorie macht die Verwirklichung einer deliberativen Politik nicht von einer kollektiv handlungsfähigen Bürgerschaft abhängig, sondern von der Institutionalisierung entsprechender Verfahren.“ [‘In discourse theory, the realisation of deliberative politics does not depend on a citizenship capable of acting collectively, but on the institutionalisation of the respective procedures’; own translation.]
partiality are manifest within a discourse, or stated differently, the degree to which participants approach the deliberations with a view towards agreement or compromise. As indicators for reciprocity Chambers suggests the consistency of argumentation, the consistency of arguments and actions, the coherence of argumentation, the recognition of the moral status of opposed views, and a disposition to openness.

Table 1 summarises the three theoretical sketches of democratic governance beyond the nation-state by listing their core dimensions and possible indicators.

**Table 1: Dimensions and Criteria of Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation State**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Dimension</th>
<th>Cosmopolitan Democracy</th>
<th>Pluralist Democracy</th>
<th>Deliberative Democracy</th>
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<td>Collective Self-</td>
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<td>determination</td>
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<td>Discursive Quality of</td>
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<td>Opinion- and Will-</td>
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<td>formation</td>
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<td>Indicators</td>
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<td>- Conditions for active</td>
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<td>participation of citizens</td>
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<td>- Participation of affected people</td>
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<td>pation and influence</td>
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<td>- Implementation of/support for democratic rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Degree to which rep-</td>
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<td>resentatives can be held accountable by the represented</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Existence of a shared public sphere</td>
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<td>- Disaggregation of power</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Universality: lack of barriers to participation and high degree of participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Rationality: role of power in the deliberative process</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Reciprocity: participants are open to listen to other participants’ arguments</td>
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The distinction between collective self-determination, democratic control and the discursive quality of opinion- and will-formation allows a comparison of the different mechanisms of transnational rule making with regard to their legitimacy. The following section, by using the example of the World Commission on Dams, provides such an analysis.

**3.2 Empirical Analysis: the Democratic Legitimacy of the World Commission on Dams**

Within the two years of its existence, the World Commission on Dams (WCD) has become a reference point for many: proponents of public-private partnerships praise it as a model on which future transnational institutions ought to be built, and governments as well as non-governmental organisations have started to refer to the WCD’s recommendations in their day-to-day work. The mandate, institutional design and results of the WCD will be briefly summarised in the following paragraphs.15

15 The empirical analysis is based on the primary documents made available on the WCD’s website (www.dams.org) as well as on other accessible primary sources as well as on a number of secondary sources. Among the latter, the description of the WCD process by Dubash et al. (2001) proved most helpful.
The idea to set up a World Commission on Dams goes back to a 1997 workshop convened by the World Bank and the World Conservation Union (IUCN) in Gland, Switzerland (cf. IUCN/World Bank 1997). The background for convening the workshop to which 37 participants had been invited was the situation around international dam building. While large dams\(^{16}\) had been considered as effective, clean and largely harmless instruments of energy and development policy until the early 1970s, this perception changed rapidly in the mid-1970s. Protests of environmental and human rights activists became more powerful and the international public became increasingly aware of the problems associated with large dams. More and more often, protest movements succeeded in hindering or even stopping large dam projects. The deadlock between proponents and opponents of large dams however came at a high cost to both sides. While governments and private businesses could hardly start any new projects, dam opponents invested large proportions of their resources into their battle against large dams. Finally, multilateral development banks such as the World Bank were attacked by critics because they had been acting as the main lender for large dam projects until the 1970s (Khagram 1999: 5f).

At this stage, the World Bank and IUCN had the idea to bring both sides back to the table. As a start, the Gland workshop aimed at discussing a World Bank paper on large dams (World Bank 1996) and to elaborate guidelines for a further study to be carried out by the Bank. However, the participants went beyond this agenda and suggested setting up an independent commission (IUCN/World Bank 1997: 9-12), thus addressing a prominent call by dam opponents (Declaration of Curitiba 1997). With regard to the commission’s mandate, the workshop participants agreed that it should first provide a global overview of the development effectiveness of large dams and their alternatives, and that it should subsequently develop internationally accepted standards, guidelines and decision-making criteria for the planning, evaluation, building, monitoring, operation and decommissioning of large dams (IUCN/World Bank 1997: 9f).\(^{17}\) The structure and process of the WCD were guided by this mandate and by the background of the large dams debate (cf. Khagram 1999: 10-14). At the centre of the WCD process was the twelve-member commission itself that was established to guide the global inspection of the development effectiveness and develop guidelines for future projects. The twelve commissioners should not see themselves as representatives of particular interest groups (see e.g. WCD 1999b: 4). Their selection by an Interim Working Group (IWG) consisting of World Bank and IUCN staff plus a so-called reference group con-

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\(^{16}\) Large dams are conventionally defined as dams with a height of 15 or more, or with a height between 10 and 15 meters and a crest length of over 500 meters, a spillway discharge of over 2,000 cubic meters, or a reservoir volume of more than 1 million cubic meters (Oud und Muir 1997: 19).

\(^{17}\) The envisaged status of the standards and guidelines was not specified by the workshop participants. While the term ‘internationally acceptable’ can be interpreted as charging the commission with the task of working towards the ultimate goal of a multilateral agreement, the composition as well as the character of the commission leave no doubt that the immediate goal of the commission’s work could not go beyond the development of non-binding recommendations.
sisting of participants of the Gland Workshops was however strictly guided by criteria of balanced representation. During their two years term, the commissioners convened at nine commission meetings and took part in a number of other activities of the work program (WCD 2001b: 4).

The commission was supported by a secretariat staffed with ten professionals and based in Cape Town, South Africa. The secretariat assisted the commission in its day-to-day work and facilitated the WCD process. In addition, the secretariat acted as a mediator between the commission and the WCD Forum on the one hand, and the commission and a wider public on the other. The WCD Forum consisted of 70 stakeholders invited by the commission; its main purpose was to serve as a “sounding board” (WCD 1999e) for the commission’s work. The commission made use of this sounding board on two occasions – the Forum meeting in Prague (March 1999) and in Cape Town (April 2000). A number of forum members also provided further services such as, for instance, commenting papers prepared for the WCD Knowledge Base.  

In order to examine the development effectiveness of large dams and to develop international guidelines for future projects the commission needed an information base which it commissioned in the form of a broadly based Knowledge Base. The work program for this Knowledge Base encompassed eight case studies, three country studies, 17 thematic reviews on social, ecological, economic and financial as well as institutional aspects of large dams, four regional consultations Colombo, Sao Paolo, Cairo and Hanoi, and a so-called cross-check survey which encompassed quantitative data on 125 dams. In addition, the secretariat received 947 submissions from individuals or institutions (WCD 1999f). As a result, the WCD Knowledge Base, which has been made available to the public via the World Wide Web (www.dams.org), is widely considered the most comprehensive analysis of the consequences of large dams so far.

In November 2000, the commission presented its final report Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making in London. In its report, the commission concludes that the majority of the 45,000 large dams built so far have either failed to fulfil the expectations associated with them or that they have had far more detrimental consequences than had been foreseen in the planning phase. According to the report, in particular social and ecological consequences have been given only marginal considerations in the planning of many large dams. The report estimates the overall number of displacements due to large dam projects to be between 40 and 80 million people. In its guidelines for future dam building, the commission is guided by existing rules of international law and recommends an approach that gives particular emphasis to rights and risks of affected people. In addition, the Commission defines five core values that should guide decisions with regard to future projects. These values

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18 The WCD received funds from 54 (inter-)governmental agencies, private businesses and civil society organizations. The total budget amounted to approx. 10 Million USD; the maximum share of a single donor was below 12% of the total budget (see WCD 2001b: 20f).
are equity, efficiency, participatory decision-making, sustainability and accountability. The core values are translated into seven strategic priorities, which are then further specified in the form of 26 guiding principles (cf. WCD 2000b: Chapters 7-9).

The report of the WCD found a mostly positive echo in the international public (cf. Dubash et al. 2001: 101-112 and www.dams.org/media). In particular, the commission was praised for bridging the wide gaps and actually agreeing on a common document despite the existing controversies. In addition, many also welcomed the substance of the commission’s contribution. For instance, the report’s emphasis on the numerous social and ecological consequences of large dams and und their lack of considerations in past projects was approved by many civil society groups. Industry organisations however lamented that the benefits of many large dams had not been given enough consideration in the commission’s report. Finally, reactions from governments were mixed. While in particular governments from industrialised countries welcomed the guidelines developed by the commission, some government representatives from developing countries felt that they were too strict and that they endangered the development potentials of developing countries (cf. Baur 2001: 26; Dubash et al. 2001: 111).

While a follow-up process to the WCD has been established under the umbrella of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) in order to continue the multi-stakeholder dialogue on large dams, dam builders and operators, whether actually or rhetorically, have already begun to use the recommendations of the commission as a point of reference. In this way, they contribute to creating and strengthening an international norm dynamic along the guidelines established by the WCD (Konukiewitz 2002; see also Development Today 2001; Thakkar 2001).

After this brief overview of the commission’s work, the following sections will address the question to what extent the World Commission on Dams’ rule-making process adhered to the requirements of legitimate rule-making beyond the nation-state. In analogy to the criteria elaborated in section 3.1, the analysis will cover the dimensions of collective self-determination, democratic control and discursive practice.

**PARTICIPATION, REPRESENTATION AND DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY**

Richard Falk (1999), characterised the WCD in its early stages by saying “It may turn out that what is most memorable about this Commission is that it has successfully initiated an inclusive democratic process that has encompassed the most relevant voices.” Which voices the WCD has integrated in what ways will be the focus of this section. In sum, the WCD focused on two mechanisms in order to generate a broad basis of legitimacy: First, the selection of the commissioners and of the forum members followed the principle of equal representation of the core stakeholder categories. Sec-

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19 For an overview see http://www.unep-dams.org.
20 For an overview of national initiatives see WCD (2001b: 18) as well as the DDP’s website (see fn. 19).
ond, several parts of the work program involved opportunities for various actors to participate in the overall process.

Starting with the workshop organised by IUCN and the World Bank, the principle of balanced representation of governments or (inter-)governmental agencies, industry and civil society characterises almost all of the organs of the WCD.

In addition to the Gland Workshop, where invitations were sent out to the organisations who then named their representatives (Dubash et al. 2001: 33), balanced representation was crucial with regard to the choice of the commissioners. Accordingly, the composition of the commission was the subject of heated debates in the early days of the WCD process (Dubash et al. 2001: 38f; Scudder 2001: 333f).

When it started its work in spring 1998, the commission included representatives of all identified stakeholder categories. The WCD chair Kader Asmal, Shen Guoyi from the Chinese Ministry of Water Resources, and the chair of the Australian Murray-Darling Basin Commission, Donald Blackmore represented the governmental sector. In addition, José Goldemberg, a former state secretary for science and technology for the Brazilian government, also had experience in government. For the private sector, Göran Lindahl, CEO of Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. (ABB)—one of the world’s largest corporations active in dam building—and Jan Veltrop, the former president of the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), participated in the commission. Finally, civil society was represented through the participation of Judy Henderson, Chair of Oxfam International, Joji Cariño from the Tebtebba Foundation, International Centre for Indigenous Policy, Research and Education, Deborah Moore from Environmental Defense and, most prominently, Medha Patkar as the charismatic leader of the Indian civil society movement Struggle to Save the Narmada River. The commission was completed by Thayer Scudder, a leading expert on the social consequences of large dams and by the commissions’ vice chair Lakhsmi Chand Jain, an Indian diplomat with

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21 Balanced representation of various groups can point to the efforts to include a broad stakeholder basis. Considered in isolation, however, balanced representation tells little about the conditions for an active participation of interested citizens, about the inclusion of affected people, or about the equality of access to the WCD process. The fact that various social groups were, in terms of numbers, similarly represented can thus serve only as a weak indicator for the degree of democratic self-determination. For this reason, it is not listed in the list of indicators in section 3.1.1.

22 Dubash et al. (2001: 31) report that the IUCN made the joint hosting of the workshop together with the World Bank conditional to the inclusion of all parties.

23 Shen Guoyi resigned after one year in office. Officially, she resigned due to health reasons; but the fact that the Chinese government did not propose a replacement supports the assumption that political reasons were primary. One interpretation of the resignation is thus that the Chinese government became increasingly critical towards the WCD because it feared negative consequences for its own ongoing projects, among them the Three Gorges Dam as the largest dam project ever undertaken by mankind (see Dubash et al. 2001: 42).

24 ICOLD acts as an interest group of the international dam building industry. Veltrop replaced former ICOLD president Wolfgang Pircher who was originally selected as a commissioner but resigned after only a short period of office (Dubash et al. 2001: 42).
experience as a member of the planning commission of a number of Indian states. Achim Steiner, the secretary general of the WCD, participated in the WCD’s deliberations as an ex officio member (cf. WCD 1999b: 2f).

While the WCD Forum, consisting of some 70 organisations, was also structured along the central stakeholder groups (cf. Dubash et al. 2001: 46f), the core criterion for the composition of the secretariat was less balanced representation but rather professionalism (Dubash et al. 2001: 44ff). As a central hub between the different WCD organs, the secretariat’s influence on the design of the WCD process can hardly be underestimated (Dubash et al. 2001: 68f).

The work program to create an extensive Knowledge Base constituted a further opportunity to engage stakeholders, in particular at the local level, in the commission’s work. With regard to this aspect, Dubash et al. (2001: 56) however argue that in the early phase of the WCD process, the necessary publicity was missing in order to widen the discussion about the work program to a larger number of stakeholders. While the secretariat made different drafts available on the WCD’s internet pages and invited comments, this internet forum was, for the time being, little known so that the comments that were received mostly stemmed from persons with personal or professional links to WCD staff. While the participation of stakeholders increased in the later stages of the WCD process—that is, after the framework for creating the Knowledge Base had been defined—the resources for incorporating the public submissions into the commission’s work were generally scarce throughout the commission’s lifetime (Dubash et al. 2001: 66).

Within the framework of the work program, the case and country studies, the thematic reviews and the regional consultations provided a particular opportunity for participatory components. Thus, in each of the eight case studies, participation was guaranteed through two meetings on site. A first meeting was designed to give local stakeholders the chance to discuss the case study design and to point to potential shortcomings. The second meeting intended to deliver the same service with regard to the preliminary results of the study (WCD 1999g). While some studies show that the chance to incorporate the experiences of a broad basis of local stakeholders was indeed made use of (see e.g. Soils Incorporated Pty/Chalo Environmental and Sustainable Development Consultants 2000; WCD 1999a), other case studies appear to have been less participatory (Norwegian Institute for Nature Research/Eastern Norway Research Institute 2000).

For the thematic reviews, participatory elements were largely restricted to the review authors’ interviews with stakeholders (Resolve Inc. et al. 2000), the occasional incorporation of public submissions (Cropper et al. 2000; Sadler et al. 2000) and—as

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25 The Indian government however perceived both Indian commissioners as belonging to the camp of dam opponents. Accordingly, government participation on the WCD process was only marginal (cf. Dubash et al. 2001: 43).
with all products of the WCD’s Knowledge Base—to the review process in which Forum members and external consultants could comment on the draft versions of the respective texts (see WCD 1999i). In addition, two of the thematic reviews made use of internet conferences (Aylward et al. 2001; Sadler et al. 2000). Finally, the four regional consultations constituted a further starting point for participation of a broader stakeholder basis. The consultations allowed the commissioners to learn about different regional perspectives. A selection of the contributions to these regional consultations was made by the WCD secretariat, which again took charge of having a balanced representation of the three sectors. Travel costs were reimbursed for presenters. The consultations were usually heavily structured and allowed for only a limited exchange of arguments (cf. Dubash et al. 2001: 81-84; WCD 1998, 1999c, 1999d, 2000c).

In sum, by making use of the above-mentioned instruments, the WCD managed to mobilise a considerably broad range of stakeholders and to give voice to interests often marginalised in different settings such as, for instance, intergovernmental fora. However, the principle of democratic self-determination as outlined above requires, besides providing the opportunity for active participation, as a second criterion that affected people are equipped with equal access to decision making. Here, two important shortcomings of the WCD process are worth mentioning.

First, the definition of public actors, business and civil society as the core stakeholder categories obscures important differences within these sectors. Thus, as the examples of women and of project-affected people show, these categories are by no means the only ones one could think of. Women, for instance, were underrepresented in nearly all parts of the WCD process. This holds true for the Gland Workshop, of whose 37 participants no more than two were female (Dubash et al. 2001: 33), as well as for the WCD Forum (Dubash et al. 2001: 47), in which, according to one participant a “technocratic bias in the overall discourse” (Guttal 2001) marginalised gender issues. While five (reduced to four after the resignation of Shen Guoyi) of the twelve commissioners were women, it is striking that all of them represented civil society organisations, thus being in a relatively weaker position than their male counterparts (Dubash et al. 2001: 41f). This non-consideration of women as a stakeholder category in its own right is particularly striking against the background of the issues discussed. Thus, Dubash et al. (2001: 47) identify women as one of the most important stakeholder groups in the field of water use and water management. Their role is also acknowledged in Principle 3 of the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development adopted in the run-up to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992.

26 The cross check survey of 125 large dams was mainly based on quantitative data and besides the potential openness with regard to external data did not include participative components (cf. WCD 1999b).
27 The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development essentially shaped the water chapter of the Agenda 21 (Hoering 2003: 33). Principle 3 of the Statement reads: “Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water: This pivotal role of women as providers and us-
In addition, the group of project-affected people is usually much larger than the number of people threatened with displacement. In particular, the—positive as well as negative—consequences downstream of the dam are often distributed over large and diverse groups of people. Since these groups are difficult to organise, their interests are in danger of being given only little attention (cf. Scudder 1997). While the WCD has covered the issue extensively in the composition of its Knowledge Base, it is hard to see how it has attempted to meet the practical difficulties to engage these groups in the WCD process.

A second criticism can be raised against the WCD’s stakeholder approach, which essentially rests on the assumption that all identified stakeholder interests ought to be treated as equally important and legitimate. Thus, within the process, no distinction is made between the interests of the private sector—which, at least in the case of publicly funded dam-building projects, only has a secondary role as a contractor—and (groups of) people who are directly affected in their individual or group rights. While the legitimacy of participating governments, at least where they are democratically legitimated, raises the least concerns, civil society participants can, in some cases, invoke specific rights—for instance when a dam project threatens the cultural foundations of a community. In contrast, it is much harder to make the case for the democratic legitimacy of private sector participants in the WCD. The fact that such legitimacy is not readily recognizable points to a general problem in the literature on global public policy networks. In contrast to Reinicke, I would argue that it is by no means “immediately obvious that the involvement of nonstate actors itself contributes to a reduction in the democratic deficit” (Reinicke 1998: 101). Instead, the definition of legitimate participants is itself a central as well as problematic element of democratic theory. Here, the stakeholder concept, by conceptually levelling the interests of categories with different qualities of affectedness, conceals that not all interests are necessarily equally legitimate (Iyer 2001).

Thus, a local official’s interest in increasing his salary via taking a bribe he can expect to go hand in hand with the realisation of a dam project can hardly claim the same legitimacy as the interests of people who would need to be displaced as a consequence of a dam project. The question who is to draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate interests (or between different degrees of legitimacy) and which criteria should guide such a decision is however left open in the stakeholder rhetoric. This

ers of water and guardians of the living environment has seldom been reflected in institutional arrangements for the development and management of water resources. Acceptance and implementation of this principle requires positive policies to address women’s specific needs and to equip and empower women to participate at all levels in water resources programmes, including decision-making and implementation, in ways defined by them” (The Dublin Statement 1992).

28 In contrast to governmental as well as civil society organizations, business actors can only indirectly invoke a concern for the common good. See, for instance, Vaillancourt Rosenau (2000: 223): “Private sector companies have moral obligations to investors that take precedent over obligations to customers.”
would be different if the definition of legitimate stakeholder interests was based on an approach that assessed the legitimacy on the basis of rights and risks of affected people. Ironically, while the WCD in its final report suggests such an approach for future decision-making procedures in the field of dam building (cf. WCD 2000b: 206-211), the commission itself eventually lacks such a basis for its own legitimacy.

POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

“We pride ourselves on our transparency” (Asmal 2000b: 45). The World Commission on Dams, according to its own self-image, set new standards in terms of democratic control. This section will critically examine which control mechanisms were included in the WCD process and how successful they have been. The discussion is structured along the criteria of (1) accountability, (2) transparency, and (3) the existence and quality of a shared public sphere.29

(1) In terms of its political accountability, the WCD process did not include any substantive formal control mechanisms. However, the absence of formal control was, at least partly, compensated for by the existence of a number of informal control mechanisms. Thus, based on the lasting conflict that constituted the basis of the WCD, the commission was dependent on its process and products eventually being acceptable to the most relevant conflict parties. Here, the WCD Forum was intended to play a major role.

The WCD Forum served the commissioners as an institutionalised instrument “to receive feedback on their ongoing work” (Dubash et al. 2001: 46). Comprising some 70 organisations, this broadened reference group constituted a control mechanism vis-à-vis which the commission could test its arguments and results (Dubash et al. 2001: 91; Khagram 1999: 12). For this purpose, the WCD process envisaged two Forum meetings.30 The first meeting in March 1999 in Prague served to establish and formalise the interaction between various actors and to discuss the WCD’s work program (WCD 2001b: 5). At a second meeting held in Cape Town in April 2000, the discussions focused on the core elements and on those results of the work program that were already available at the time of the meeting (Asmal 2000a; WCD 2000a, 2001b: 5). While, all things considered, the forum met its function as a control mechanism, the reservations made with regard to the participation in the overall WCD process can also be made with regard to the selection of Forum members. Thus, women were also underrepresented in

29 The disaggregation of power as a further element of democratic control will not be analysed in detail in this section. In the case of the WCD, it consisted mainly in the veto positions held by those actors, whose consensus was required for any agreement to be effective. The power constellation was therefore primarily determined by the underlying problem structure of which the design of the WCD process appears to be derivative. Since it is argued that the WCD process has not (or only marginally) influenced the constellation existing before the establishment of the WCD an in-depth analysis seems unnecessary.

30 The third Forum meeting (February 2001) in Spier Village near Cape Town was not part of the original WCD process. The meeting served to discuss the final report and possible follow-up measures (see WCD 2001a).
the Forum, and Forum members only covered stakeholders from certain regions while stakeholders from other regions with extensive dam-building activities such as, for instance, Turkey were not represented.

(2) Since formal mechanisms of accountability were largely absent, the transparency of the decision-making process played an all the more important role. As indicators for a transparent decision-making process, Dubash et al. (2001: 123) suggest the degree to which an institution communicates its goals to the relevant stakeholders early enough, the degree to which it communicates how these stakeholders can participate in the process and how their input will be used, and the degree to which the institution fully communicates its decisions. The WCD attempted to meet these criteria by informing via e-mail lists, via mail and via the internet an as large as possible group of stakeholders about the possibilities for participation in the WCD process. In addition, parts of the work program such as, for instance, the terms of reference for studies written by external experts or drafts and final versions of the thematic reviews and case studies were circulated widely. Most documents were made available on the internet, and regional consultations as well as local meetings served as a possibility for direct contact between the WCD and its stakeholders (Dubash et al. 2001; see also www.dams.org).

Again, these successes go along with a number of deficits. Thus, in the early days of the WCD process, information was in some instances made available only very late and as a consequence potential stakeholder reactions could not be incorporated (WCD 1999b: 27). Second, it was not always clear how the commission intended to deal with the input it received from the various groups. On the part of the stakeholders, this lack of strategy and/or communication led to rather high expectations, which the commission was unable to meet. A prominent example is the Forum’s dissatisfaction over the fact that the commission was not ready to share and discuss a draft version of its final report with Forum members. On the other hand, the limited resources of the WCD secretariat and of the authors of the various studies and reviews certainly did not allow for the stakeholder input—in particular the more than 900 public submissions—to be systematically evaluated and incorporated in the commission’s work (Dubash et al. 2001: 123). Third, while the procedures to become a member of the Forum were transparent in so far as they were based on an invitation by the Secretariat, the criteria which were decisive for being invited were however less transparent—a criticism which, in addition, could also be raised against the selection of commissioners. Fourth, the WCD’s internet-based information policy certainly helped in reaching a large number of possibly interested people at relatively low costs. At the same time, however, such a policy systematically favoured stakeholders with access to this communication technology. In the case of the dams debate, it is reasonable to assume that this group constitutes only a small minority of affected people.31 Language barriers constitute a similar

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31 According to one author, the share of people with access to the internet is 59% in the U.S., and 36% in Germany, but only 3% in China, 0,67% in India, and 0,02% in Congo (Graff 2002: 11). On another ac-
problem—the contributions to the Knowledge Base were usually made available exclusively in English language, which again systematically disadvantages certain stakeholder groups (cf. Dubash et al. 2001: 69). Finally, the deliberations of the commissioners were neither open to the public nor have protocols of their meetings been made publicly accessible.

(3) When it comes to the existence and strength of a functioning public sphere around the issues discussed by the WCD, a distinction needs to be drawn between a sectoral public sphere and a general public sphere. While a sectoral public sphere was basically created through the direct involvement of numerous stakeholders, widening public awareness to a more general (national or transnational) sphere proved a much more difficult task. The WCD attempted to achieve this aim by way of an extensive public relations campaign targeted mainly at the press. As a result, the online database maintained by the WCD contains more than 250 media reports. If however we exclude the spike in attention surrounding the presentation of the final report Dams and Development in London—a high-level event that included the presence of Nelson Mandela—this number is reduced considerably. In addition, the substantive discussion of WCD’s work in the press coverage is fairly scarce.

THE DISCURSIVE CHARACTER OF OPINION- AND WILL-FORMATION

The analysis of the discursive quality of opinion- and will-formation within the WCD process follows the three criteria discussed in section 3.1.3—universality (1), rationality (2) and reciprocity (3).

(1) Universality: As indicators for the universality of opinion- and will-formation processes, section 3.1.3 has identified first the existence of barriers which systematically exclude certain persons or groups of persons from the deliberations; and second, the degree of participation or of the willingness to participate. Both indicators have already been discussed in the previous sections: While the WCD process managed to mobilise a relatively large spectrum of affected interests, barriers to participation existed in particular in relation to the definition of relevant stakeholder categories by the initiators of the WCD and in relation to the internet-based information policy which privileged certain stakeholders while discriminating against others.

(2) Rationality: To some observers, the fact that the commission was able to agree on a consensus report already constitutes a major success. But how has this consensus been achieved—and which role has power played in the communication process? As I have discussed above, any answer to this question is inevitably faced with methodological difficulties. In the case of the WCD, the closed character of the commis-

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32 This criticism points to the general problem of North-South differences in the degree of alphabetisation and education, which generally undermine equal access to control mechanisms at a global policy level.

sion's deliberations poses an additional problem. Thus, meeting protocols are not accessible to the public and the World Resources Institute's research team which observed the WCD process over its full lifetime was also not allowed to attend the commission meetings (Dubash et al. 2001: 6). Based on the interviews the team conducted with commissioners, it however appears that the WCD chair Kader Asmal played a crucial role in the early days of the WCD. As the commission chair, he applied an approach of ‘sufficient consensus’ in order to further the process (Dubash et al. 2001: 87). While in the first meeting, tensions between the various commissioners came to the fore, the situation later changed and Dubash et al. (2001: 88) were then able to observe a “remarkable climate of mutual respect on a personal level and a growing willingness to listen to each other”. The most important basis for such a climate of respect were the general approach—that is, the generation of a common knowledge basis—and shared experiences such as, for instance, the regional consultations. Thus, one commissioner reports that “a joint fact-finding, with a common knowledge base ... allowed us to build trust” (member of the commission, quoted after Dubash et al. 2001: 89). Besides the expertise of the commissioners in various areas, the external expectations also contributed to a consensus orientation among the commission members. Again, Dubash et al. (2001: 89) illustrate their point by quoting one commissioner: “We realised what would be at stake if no agreement would be reached” (member of the commission, quoted after Dubash et al. 2001: 89).

Where and how power played a role in the deliberations of the commissioners is, however, difficult to trace in detail. On the part of both the public and private sectors some concerns were raised with regard to the commission’s alleged bias in favour of the civil society actors, which were generally referred to as dam opponents. To what extent these concerns were justified can however not be answered on the basis of the scarce information available about the commission’s internal communication process. The fact that all major stakeholder groups had to search for a result that would be equally acceptable for all core actors in the dams debate may again have served as an effective control mechanisms. Thus, the participating non-governmental organisations and social movements eventually had to abandon their call for a global moratorium on large dams (Konukiewitz 2002).

(3) Reciprocity: Finally, the principle of reciprocity asks to what extent participants approached deliberations with a view towards potential consensus rather than basing their actions on purely strategic reasoning. Here, the previous chapter has named six indicators: the consistency of arguments; the consistency of arguments and actions; the coherence of arguments; the acknowledgement of the moral status of opposing views; the readiness to re-think one’s own positions; and the degree to which deliberations are approached from the perspective of a potential consensus. While the

34 See, for instance, Gopalakrishnan (2001): “It can more appropriately be said that WCD (sic) is not a World Commission on Dams but a ‘World Commission on Anti-Dams’.”
available data hardly allow for reliable conclusions to be drawn on the internal communication process of the commission, at least some observations can be made in relation to the latter three indicators. Thus, Dubash et al. (2001: 88) emphasise the climate of mutual respect among commission members, and they also give examples for the commissioners’ readiness to re-think their positions. Approaching the deliberations with the aim and hope to actually find a consensus eventually was an idea that lay at the heart of the WCD process and its background. Accordingly, the orientation towards achieving a consensus was also manifest in the practice of the commission’s work (Dubash et al. 2001: 88f).

To summarise, the discursive quality of the WCD’s opinion- and will-formation process is difficult to assess, and no definite picture emerges. From the theoretical perspective of deliberative democracy, two important deficits need however to be reported. First, as with the definition of the relevant stakeholder categories, the decisions on the design of the WCD process—the decision on the WCD’s ‘constitution’—constitutes a second core element which was the subject of exclusive deliberations of a small group of people. Since the concept of procedure—and therefore the decisions on procedures—lies at the very heart of deliberative democracy, reporting these deficits of the WCD process is more than merely academic aspiration for a complete analysis. In contrast, the deficit is further increased by the fact that even a sectoral public sphere hardly existed during the early stages of the WCD process. Second, deliberative elements beyond the internal deliberations of the commission are rather hard to find. Thus, Dubash et al. (2001: 93) argue that within the Forum, the room for a true dialogue among stakeholders was very limited. In addition, the fact that the WCD process only envisaged two Forum meetings further supports this criticism. With regard to the regional consultations, these were heavily structured and, according to Dubash et al. (2001: 81), only rarely provided a forum in which arguments could be exchanged:

„Far from allowing free-flowing dialogue at its consultations, the Commission carefully handpicked presenters for the regional consultations and timed the speeches strictly. The result was a consultation that was structured around a series of testimonies, lending the Commissioners the air of judges who would weigh the evidence in an independent manner“ (Dubash et al. 2001: 81).

Finally, while the studies that were prepared for the Knowledge Base made extensive use of external reviews,35 the review process however remained limited to a rather small group of experts and stakeholders.36

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35 In particular the review comments are used to criticize the validity propositions and arguments. Thus, an employee of the World Bank criticizes a draft version of one study because in his view, the “paper looks biased against new and large projects without a demonstrated stated reason” (Gonzalez in Sanmuganathan et al. 2000: 228).

36 This analysis is based on a review of the reviewer comments made on the 17 thematic studies of the WCD Knowledge Base. Authors received between 5 and 23 comments from experts and stakeholders. Many names and institutions of reviewers appear more than once, so that the group of reviewers remains reasonable.
4 Conclusions

The discussion of the World Commission on Dams shows that the democratic legitimacy of global public policy networks is a complex subject matter. In some areas, the WCD process accounts for significant successes; in other fields deficits dominate. Table 2 summarises the main findings of the empirical analysis.

Table 2: Successes and Deficits of the WCD Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic Self-Determination</th>
<th>Democratic Control</th>
<th>Discursive Opinion- and Will-Formation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Successes</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Participation of affected</td>
<td>- Dependency on consen-</td>
<td>- Considerable interest in participating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people.</td>
<td>sus of certain stakeholder</td>
<td>among civil society organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>groups (i.e., veto position of different groups).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Availability of information on the WCD via the internet.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Considerable interest in participating among civil society organisations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Actual participation of affected people.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deficits</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Definition/selection of rele-</td>
<td>- Unequal access to information due to internet-based information policy and language barriers.</td>
<td>- Decision on the design of the overall WCD process not subject of public discussions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vant constituencies by only a</td>
<td>- Lack of public awareness/information in the early stages of the WCD process.</td>
<td>- Lack of public awareness/information in the early stages of the WCD process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>small group of people.</td>
<td>- No formal control mechanisms</td>
<td>- Only limited scope of deliberative elements in addition to the deliberations of the commission itself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- No distinction between differ-</td>
<td>- Unequal access to control mechanisms.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ent degrees of legitimacy of the various participants.</td>
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</table>

In terms of successes, the relatively broad participation of affected actors stands out as a particularly achievement. In addition, an effective informal control mechanism was in place since the implementation of any results heavily relied on recommendations to be supported by all major actors. Third, the WCD secretariat made available almost all information about the WCD process on the internet.

In terms of deficits, the definition of the relevant stakeholder categories by the WCD’s initiating organisations and the WCD’s lack of formal control mechanisms are the most problematic aspects of the commission’s legitimacy record. The World Commission on Dams made an attempt to mitigate these deficits by way of a balanced representation of stakeholder groups and through relying on activities at various policy levels. While the local consultations appear to have been particularly successful in this regard—in some cases they even contributed to a democratisation of national decision-making structures (cf. Dubash u. a. 2001: 78; Ecoportal Argentina 2000; see also Khagram 2000: 106)—and while the basis for inclusion was relatively comprehensive, the trichotomy of (inter-)governmental, business and civil society actors reflected the reality only insufficiently. The examples of women and so called other project-affected people as possible additional stakeholder categories help to illustrate the implications of these deficits. The fact that the decision on what kind of groups should be represented
in the WCD was effectively made by no more than two actors can, from the perspective of democratic theory, hardly be legitimated. At a more practical level, the selection only considers those groups that had a factual veto position in the large dams debate, thus largely reproducing existing power structures. Finally, within the WCD process all interests were given equal treatment, a rights-based approach such as the one eventually suggested for future decision-making by the commission itself would have required a much more differentiated consideration of whom to include in what ways.

While this lengthy discussion of the WCD may be interesting and valuable in itself, the more interesting question for analysts of world politics is to what extent its results can be generalised. What do these specific findings tell us about the democratic legitimacy of global public policy networks in general? First of all, it needs to be restated that any generalisation is limited to those networks that, as the WCD, are or have been concerned with the negotiation of guidelines, rules or standards. A study such as this one thus cannot give much information about the legitimacy of networks that fulfil other functions nor about global public policy networks in general. In order to come to more general conclusions about networks within which rules and standards are negotiated two strategies however lend themselves. First, the record of other global public policy networks with such a function can be consulted. Second, it can be examined to what extent the successes and deficits are tied to the defining characteristics of global public policy networks.

The first of these strategies bears some difficulties, since the number of empirical studies on the joint rule making of public and private actors at the global level of politics is still very small. Among the 20 studies compiled within the UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks, only four networks—including the World Commission on Dams—have been involved in the business of negotiating guidelines or standards. To further complicate the matter, two of the remaining three networks do not fall clearly within the definition of global public policy networks. Thus, the network in which the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were negotiated did not include business actors and the process itself appears to be fairly similar to many cases of international negotiations (cf. Bagshaw 1999). In contrast, the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) which aimed at elaborating workers and social standards for the U.S.-based apparel industry and its subcontractors can at least be considered as a trisectoral policy network if the symbolic support the initiative received from the White House is taken into account. Since the regulated subject as well as the participation in the network was, however, geographically limited to the United States, the AIP can hardly be referred to as a global public policy network (cf. Bobrowsky 1999).

Thus, among the objects of the UN Vision Project’s case studies, only the ISO 14000 process remains as a valid point of reference. Here, two very good empirical studies exist—the Vision Project’s case study by Virginia Haufler (1999) and another insightful study by Jennifer Clapp (1998). Both these studies lend support to the as-
sumption that the results of the World Commission on Dams are at least not entirely untypical for global public policy networks concerned with negotiating transnational standards or rules.

Within the framework of the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), the ISO 14000 process aimed at negotiating internationally accepted standards on Environmental Management Systems (EMS). Before the ISO 14000 process had started, a number of national as well as business specific standards existed in parallel. Since these standards could hardly be compared to each other, and since a number of potential conflicts existed between these various standards and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the existing standards were considered as insufficient (cf. Haufler 1999: 7f).

The legitimacy gaps of the ISO 14000 process are similar to those of the WCD. Here too, the original framing of the problem and the selection of the institutional framework in which to address the problem are crucial. The decision to negotiate the standards within the ISO reflected in particular the interests of one stakeholder group, namely industry. As a result of this decision, the participation of developing countries was initially only marginal (Clapp 1998: 306). Finally, civil society organisations in large parts of the process played only a marginal role. While NGOs first underestimated the significance of the standards, they later on had difficulties to raise the required funds in order to finance their participation. In addition, many NGOs lacked the familiarity with the ISO and its complex procedures.

In addition to the relatively low level of participation, some developing country participants complained about difficulties to receive relevant information and documents in time—or, in some cases, to receive them at all—in order to be able to effectively participate in negotiations (Haufler 1999: 13). Furthermore, the ISO procedures are very lengthy, complicated and decentralised (cf. Haufler 1999: 5; see also Clapp 1998: 299). In terms of transparency, the ISO 14000 process thus differs from the WCD process mostly where the latter could legitimately claim to have been, at least partially, successful. In terms of political accountability, both processes have, in turn, a

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37 EMS relate to the way in which private corporations develop and implement a business-wide environmental strategy as part of their overall management system (Haufler 1999: 3).

38 As a decisive factor contributing to the marginal participation of developing countries, Clapp reports that participants of ISO decision-making processes have to bear the costs of their participation. Only from 1995 onwards, funds were increasingly made available to allow for a broader participation of developing countries (Clapp 1998: 307). However, this did not lead to a fundamental change either: “While 92 percent of industrialized countries were present at the Oslo meeting and voted on the standards, only 16 percent of developing countries were present and voting” (Clapp 1998: 306).

39 For instance, in the U.S. Technical Advisory Group (TAG), NGOs were represented only after 1994—that is, three years into the negotiation process. Participation of civil society thus appears marginal. In addition, NGO representatives criticized that consulting agencies whom they suspected of having a primary interest in creating a new market for certification and monitoring were allowed to participate in the negotiations (see Haufler 1999: 16).

40 See Haufler (1999: 23): “For many NGOs and developing countries, the process appears opaque, expensive, and industry-led.”
rather similar record. As in the case of the WCD, the ISO 14000 process could rely on an informal mechanism of accountability in that decisions could only be effective if they could count on the support of the most important stakeholders. Since a common interest in achieving a consensus existed in particular among participants from industrialised societies, mechanisms of accountability were in force primarily at the level of the individual nation states where industry and consumer organisations could influence the position of their national representatives. Here too, the group of those who had access to this control mechanism was accordingly restricted to a specific group of stakeholders. In particular, producers and consumers from developing countries did not, despite the expected consequences for their own interests, have the same veto power with regard to the standards to be set by the ISO 14000 process.41

As a result, the studies on the ISO 14000 process confirm the deficits that have been mentioned in the analysis of the WCD process. In addition, the studies further point to a number of problems related to the differences in material resources on the side of civil society organisations. While some Northern NGOs had been able to afford the costly participation at least during parts of the deliberations, their Southern counterparts for a considerable period of time remained outside the process. This empirical analysis finally conforms to most of the theoretical analysis of the observed successes and failures against the background of the defining characteristics of global public policy networks. While the successes eventually appear as contingent, at least some of the deficits are rooted in the conception of global public policy networks.

First, proponents of global public policy networks explicitly claim that negotiations within the networks are more inclusive than traditional intergovernmental negotiations. While the example of the WCD shows that it is at least partially possible to have a relatively broad stakeholder participation in the decision-making process, the ISO 14000 process demonstrates that this quality does not necessarily apply to all global public policy networks in general. Secondly, in the case of the WCD it was argued that an informal control mechanism existed in the need for a compromise due to the factual veto power of some stakeholder groups. While a similar constellation was also reported for the ISO 14000 negotiations, the veto power of the actors in question was grounded less in the defining characteristics of global public policy networks as such but rather in the problem structure underlying the creation of the network.

In contrast, the lack of formal control mechanisms and the deficits with regard to the selection of participants are direct consequences of the conceptualisation of global public policy networks. As opposed to tedious intergovernmental negotiation processes in which delegates have a formal mandate to negotiate on behalf of their governments, the networks are conceptualised as innovative and flexible instruments in

41 Haufler (1999: 13) quotes developing country participants as saying that from an economic point of view they had no alternative to adopt the standards.
which cumbersome control mechanisms such as the possibilities to elect or recall delegates or the control by national parliaments is not part of the institutional design. Here, intergovernmental negotiation processes have a decisive advantage because at least a large part of the participants are formally accountable towards (and can thus be held accountable by) their governments and towards the people they represent. Finally, the deficits with regard to the definition of stakeholder categories—and, as a consequence, the selection of network members—pose the most severe challenges. The core question who should on what basis make a decision about the relevant constituencies cannot be solved in a satisfying way within the model of global public policy networks. The solution offered by this model—that is, the treatment as equals of all stakeholder interests regardless of their potential differences in the degree of legitimacy—is hardly acceptable.

Given these empirical as well as theoretical findings, the potentials of global public policy networks to enhance the democratic legitimacy of inter- and transnational governance appear fairly limited. The results of this study can thus be summarised in the following points:

(1) The debate about global governance so far lacks a clear and coherent concept of democratic legitimacy beyond the nation state. Such a concept is however required in order to provide a normative vision of good global governance with a foundation as well as a goal. The distinction between the three dimensions of democratic self-governance, democratic control, and discursive opinion- and will-formation may serve as a valuable starting point for developing such a much-needed theory of transnational democracy.

(2) The studies of the UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks cannot convincingly support the argument that global public policy networks contribute to enhancing the democratic legitimacy of global governance. On the one hand, the case studies lack a clearly identifiable concept of legitimacy. On the other hand, they pay only little attention to the issue of legitimacy.

(3) Where the legitimacy of those global public policy networks that have been involved in standard setting is examined along the above-mentioned three dimensions, the resulting picture is considerably more complex than the one usually portrayed by proponents of the networks. In sum, the World Commission on Dams, while accounting for a number of partial successes, fails to render transnational decision-making around large dams more democratically legitimate for mainly two reasons. First, the WCD has failed to satisfyingly answer the most crucial question who should participate in the network and what ought to be the basis for making such a decision. Second, the approach of global public policy networks does not distinguish between potentially differing degrees of legitimacy on which the claims of various stakeholders to a right to participate in decision-making may be based. Here, international negotiations appear to have—at least where the participating governments are democratically legitimated—a decisive comparative advantage.
(4) As long as a global public sphere does not exist or is only weakly developed, public-private partnerships such as the World Commission on Dams cannot substitute international rule-making based on the legitimacy of nationally legitimated governments. However, this should not prejudice the continuing effort to gain an improved understanding of what the concept of democratic governance beyond the nation state requires in terms of the institutional design of a desirable system of global governance. In addition to improving the performance of intergovernmental negotiation processes along the three dimensions discussed in this paper, strengthening transnational communities appears as a further promising and crucial element of such a democratisation. If global public policy networks can be shown to contribute to this latter task—to what extent they do is an empirically open question—this would at least constitute a second chance for the networks to live up to the promises their proponents have often made.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABB</td>
<td>Asea Brown Boveri Ltd.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>Environmental Management Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>ICOLD</td>
<td>International Commission on Large Dams</td>
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<td>ISO</td>
<td>International Organisation for Standardisation</td>
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<td>IUCN</td>
<td>World Conservation Union</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>TAG</td>
<td>Technical Advisory Group</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>WCD</td>
<td>World Commission on Dams</td>
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